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IS THE PRIVACY ACT AN EXEMPTION 3 STATUTE AND
WHOSE STATUTE IS IT ANYWAY?
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Privacy Act' in 1974, commentators
have recognized its potential for conflict with the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA)2 disclosure provisions.3 Both statutes provide for
disclosure of government records: 4 The Privacy Act grants the subject
of the record (first-party requester) access to information about him-
self; 5 the FOIA mandates disclosure to the public.6 A major dispute
centers on whether Privacy Act disclosure exemptions may be incorpo-
rated into the FOIA automatically to bar disclosure under the FOIA. 7
If so, a further question arises as to whether the incorporated Privacy
Act exemptions should be applied only to individuals requesting infor-
mation about themselves, or to all persons requesting information
under the FOIA. Conversely, if Privacy Act exemptions are not incor-
porated into the FOIA, the issue must still be resolved whether indi-
viduals are limited to Privacy Act access provisions.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
552a (1982)).
2. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
552 (1982)).
3. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,406 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); J. O'Reilly,
Federal Information Disclosure § 20.13 (1977); Project, Government Information
and the Rights of Citizens, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 971, 1336 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Government Information]; Note, The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview, 1976 Duke
L.J. 301, 312-13; Comment, The Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption
and the Privacy Act of 1974, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 596, 628-29 & n.152 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Privacy Exemption]; Note, FOIA and Privacy Act Interface:
Toward a Resolution of Statutory Conflict, 8 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 570, 590-92 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Statutory Conflict]; Note, An Introduction to The Federal
Privacy Act of 1974 And Its Effect On The Freedom of Information Act, 11 New
Eng. L. Rev. 463, 487-93 (1976).
4. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982) (government agencies to publish or male
available their records); id. § 552a(d) (government agencies to make available their
records).
5. Id. § 552a(d). Review and copying to be permitted "upon request by any
individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining to him which
is contained in the system." Id. § 552a(d)(1).
6. Id. § 552(a). Public disclosure encompasses making records available to "any
person" who requests them. See id. § 552(a)(3).
7. Compare Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223-24 (7th Cir. 1983) (exemption
under Privacy Act bars disclosure under FOIA because of FOIA's Exemption 3), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984) and Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir.
1980) (same) and Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) (The FOIA
cannot disclose information exempt under Privacy Act), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013
(1980) with Provenzano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 799, 800 (3d Cir.
1983) (per curiam) (exemption under Privacy Act does not bar disclosure under
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The FOIA, enacted in 1966,8 requires disclosure unless the re-
quested information falls into one of nine exempted categories.0 The
third of these categories (Exemption 3)10 exempts from the FOIA's
disclosure requirement material that other statutes specifically require
to be withheld." If the Privacy Act is an Exemption 3 statute, mate-
rial that is exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act would also
be exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.' 2
FOIA), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984) and Porter v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 799 (3d Cir. 1983) (same) and Greentree v. United States
Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same); see also Duffin v. Carlson,
636 F.2d 709, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dictum) (questioning whether exemption under
Privacy Act forecloses disclosure determination under the FOIA); Case Comment,
Greentree v. United States Customs Service: A Misinterpretation of the Relationship
Between FOIA Exemption 3 and the Privacy Act, 63 B.U.L. Rev. 507, 531 (1983)
(exemption under Privacy Act bars disclosure under FOIA by operation of FOIA's
Exemption 3) [hereinafter cited as Misinterpretation]; Note, Administrative Law-
Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2) Does Not Specifically Preclude Disclosure of Informa-
tion Within Meaning of Exemption (3) of the Freedom of Information Act-Green-
tree v. United States Customs Service, 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982), 56 Temp. L.Q.
127, 132-33 (1983) (exemption under Privacy Act does not bar disclosure under
FOIA) [hereinafter cited as Privacy Act]. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari
on this question. Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 1706 (1984); Provenzano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984).
8. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
552 (1982)).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982) (listing nine exemptions); see NLRB v. Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978); Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't
of State, 685 F.2d 698, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983);
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982).
11. Exemption 3 exempts disclosure of materials that are:
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b
of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the
issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to
particular types of matters to be withheld.
Id.; see, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1284
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Medina-Hincapie v. United States Dep't of State, 700 F.2d 737,
740-42 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of State, 685
F.2d 698, 701-03 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983); Fund for
Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives, 656 F.2d 856, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Church of Scientology v. United States Postal Serv., 633 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir.
1980); Founding Church of Scientology v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 827-28 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
927 (1980); Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1219-21 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1075 (1980); Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 614 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979); American Jewish Congress v. Kreps,
574 F.2d 624, 629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
12. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983) (exemption under the
Privacy Act bars disclosure under the FOIA because of FOIA's Exemption 3), cert.
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The Privacy Act was enacted to protect individuals from the gather-
ing and dissemination of personal information by the federal govern-
ment. 13 While the FOIA also protects individuals' privacy interests,'14
an individual's rights under the Privacy Act are broader than those of
the general public under the FOIA.15 The Privacy Act, however,
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980)
(same); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) (exemption under the
Privacy Act bars disclosure under the FOIA), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980);
Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 531 (same). But see Provenzano v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 799, 800 (3d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (exemption under the
Privacy Act does not bar disclosure under the FOIA), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706
(1984); Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 799 (3d Cir. 1983)
(same); Greentree v. United States Customs Service, 674 F.2d 74, 75 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (same); Privacy Act, supra note 7, at 132-33 (Privacy Act is not an Exemption 3
statute); see also Duffin v. Carlson, 636 F.2d 709, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dictum)
(questions whether exemptions under Privacy Act forecloses disclosure determination
under the FOIA).
13. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (d)(2), (e) (1982); Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-579, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896. The Privacy Act was intended to protect citizens
from governmental invasions of personal privacy. S. Rep. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Report], reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 6916, 6916; H.R. 16373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 120
Cong. Rec. 36,643 (1974); see Antonelli v. FBI, 536 F. Supp. 568, 572 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Florida Medical Ass'n, Inc. v. HEW, 479 F. Supp. 1291, 1305-06 (M.D. Fla.
1979).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7) (1982). The FOIA's privacy protections exempt
personnel or medical files disclosure of which would constitute an "unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy," id. § 552(b)(6), and investigatory records if their
disclosure would constitute an "invasion of personal privacy," id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
These protections supercede those of the Privacy Act. Id. § 552a(b) (2); see Crooker v.
United States Parole Comm'n, No. 83-1687, slip op. at 20-21 (1st Cir. Mar. 21,
1984); Jafari v. Department of the Navy, No. 83-1629, slip op. at 4-6 (4th Cir. Feb.
7, 1984); Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v. Levi, 403 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (M.D. Tenn.
1975); Privacy Exemption, supra note 3, at 629-30. One court has noted that "the
Privacy Act was not intended to override the FOIA and in operation only prohibits
the release of information not covered by the FOIA or the discretionary release of
material which, while exempt from the FOIA, the agency might have previously
chosen to release." Antonelli v. FBI, 536 F. Supp. 568, 572 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see
Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1981); Florida Medical Ass'n v. HEW, 479 F.
Supp. 1291, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
15. Under the Privacy Act, an individual has a right of access, 5 U.S.C. §
552a(d)(1) (1982), and a right to request amendment of his record; id. § 552a(d)(2),
(3), (4). The FOIA requester only has a right of access. Id. § 552(a). Additionally, the
Privacy Act imposes agency requirements in the maintenance, collection and dissemi-
nation of personal records. Id. § 552a(e). The FOIA imposes no similar requirements.
See id. § 552. Although both the Privacy Act and the FOIA provide for de novo
judicial review of agency withholding decisions and grant attorney fees and litigation
costs if the requester "substantially prevail[s]," id. § 552a(g) (Privacy Act civil
remedy), (g)(2)(B) (Privacy Act attorney fees and litigation costs); id. § 552(a)(4)(B)
(FOIA civil remedy), (a)(4)(E) (FOIA attorney fees and litigation costs), only the
Privacy Act grants damages to the individual if the agency intentionally or willfully
violates the Privacy Act provisions, id. § 552a(g)(4).
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permits exemption from disclosure of certain specified types of records
without regard to the actual contents of the record requested.16 CIA
records, for example, are completely exempt from disclosure under
the Privacy Act. 17 The FOIA, on the other hand, contains more
flexible exemptions that are applicable only when disclosure of a
particular record 8 would bring about specific dangers identified by
Congress.19 CIA records, then would be withheld only to the extent
that disclosure would pose one of the dangers indentified in the ex-
emptions to the FOIA. 20 Thus, in some instances the FOIA will pro-
vide greater access than will the Privacy Act.2 ' Further, if the enact-
The Privacy Act was meant to protect individuals from governmental invasions of
privacy by increasing government accountability and responsibility. See Porter v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 794 (3d Cir. 1983); 1974 Senate Report,
supra note 14, at 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6916; H.R.
16,373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 120 Cong. Rec. 36,643 (1974). The rights
granted by the Privacy Act to the individual implement this congressional intent.
Porter, 717 F.2d at 794; 5 U.S.C. § 552a note (1982) (Congressional Findings and
Statement of Purposes); 120 Cong. Rec. 36,897 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
16. The Privacy Act allows the exemption of entire systems of records. 5 U.S.C. §
552a(j), (k) (1982). If the system of records is exempt by virtue of a blanket exemp-
tion, inquiry into the nature of the requested file is not required. See NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 227-29 (1978); Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d
215, 218 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Ditlow v. Brinegar,
494 F.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974). In order to
exempt a system of records, the agency must first promulgate and publish rules,
giving reasons for the exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1982); see Shapiro v. DEA,
721 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984). Thus, the
decision to exempt a system of records must be made prior to a request for files within
that system in order for the exemption to be valid. See id.
17. 5 U.S.C. §552a(j)(1) (1982). See infra notes 68, 69 and accompanying text.
18. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236 (1978) (blanket
exemptions do not apply to FOIA, although "generic" determination of harm as
specified by Congress is proper).
19. Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement procedings, for example,
are exempt under the FOIA only to the extent that they:
(A) interfere with enforcement procedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to
a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential
source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law bnforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conduct-
ing a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential infor-
mation furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982). This provision (Exemption 7) was amended to prevent
blanket exemption for all investigative records. NLRB V. Robbins Tire & Rubber
Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236 (1978). See infra notes 96, 97 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
21. Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
1706 (1984); see Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 795 (3d Cir.
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ment of the Privacy Act signals the demise of individuals' access under
the FOIA 22 the occasional greater FOIA access could disclose to any
other member of the public information unavailable to the subject of
the file. 23
In an attempt to determine whether the Privacy Act is an Exemp-
tion 3 statute or may otherwise bar disclosure under the FOIA, courts
and commentators have repeatedly analyzed the statutory language
and legislative history of the two acts.2 4 The contradictory conclusions
of these analyses25 indicate that neither the statutory language nor the
legislative history is conclusive. 26 Further, these analyses fail to distin-
guish the secondary issue-whether, if the Privacy Act is not an
Exemption 3 statute, the same result nonetheless may be achieved by
limiting individuals to Privacy Act disclosure provisions when they
request information about themselves. In order to resolve the primary
dispute it is also necessary to resolve the secondary issue, going beyond
traditional methods of statutory construction to an analysis of the
operation of the two statutes.
Part I of this Note briefly presents the alternative analyses, both of
which utilize traditional methods of statutory construction-interpre-
tation of statutory language and legislative history. Part II discusses
1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79-80 (D.C. Cir.
1982). Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1982) (blanket exemption) with id. §
552(b) (7) (exemption only for enumerated categories). The Privacy Act, for example,
completely exempts CIA records, id. § 552aa)(1), and all other personal information
records maintained by criminal law enforcement agencies, id. § 552a(j)(2). The
FOIA would exempt these same materials only to the extent that they would harm
the Government. S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Freedom of Information Act Source
Book 44 (Comm. Print 1974); see NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S.
214, 224 (1978); 120 Cong. Rec. 17,033 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Hart).
22. See infra notes 101, 102 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218-22 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d
787, 793-99 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74,
81-84 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980); Terkel
v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1979); Government Information, supra note
3, at 1336-40; Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 516-26; Privacy Exemption, supra
note 3, at 624-28; Statutory Conflict, supra note 3, at 590-92; Privacy Act, supra note
7, at 140-49.
25. Judicial acceptance of both analyses has led to an ongoing split in circuit
court opinions. See supra note 7.
26. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983)
("There is a certain amount of ambiguity in the legislative history of the Privacy Act,
with statements by members of Congress in which each side purports to find sup-
port."); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
("[T]he legislative history is not without ambiguities."); Privacy Act, supra note 7, at
146 (Neither the Privacy Act nor the FOIA show "Congress at its best in documenting
the contours and boundaries of the legislation.").
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the operation of the two statutes under the alternative analyses. First,
it examines the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 statute, distinguishing
between its application to either first-party requesters only, or to all
requesters. Second, it examines the operation of the Privacy Act as an
independent statute, distinguishing between limiting first-party access
to Privacy Act provisions and allowing first-party requesters to utilize
FOIA access provisions as well. This Note concludes that the FOIA
and the Privacy Act operate most efficiently as independent statutory
frameworks and that first-party access should not be limited to Pri-
vacy Act provisions.
I. THE ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY ANALYSES
A. The Privacy Act: An Exemption 3 Statate
The FOIA's Exemption 3 allows non-disclosure of records specifi-
cally exempted from disclosure by other statutes.27 Congress included
this exemption to reconcile the FOIA with the withholding statutes
already in existence. 28 Post-FOIA statutes, such as the Privacy Act,
also must be reconciled with the FOIA.29 Indeed, Congress recognized
the potential for overlap between the Privacy Act and the FOIA.30
The original Senate version of the Privacy Act3' contained two distinct
provisions that would have reconciled the Privacy Act with the FOIA:
(1) exemption under the Privacy Act will not impair FOIA disclo-
sure,32 and (2) exemption under the FOIA will not impair Privacy Act
disclosure.3 3 As enacted, however, the Privacy Act contains only the
second provision.3 4 Because Congress omitted the provision prohibit-
ing use of Privacy Act exemptions to impair FOIA disclosure, it may
be inferred that Congress rejected this prohibition.3 - A determination
27. See supra note 11.
28. Exemption 3 was intended to reconcile other withholding statutes with the
FOIA, as "[t]here are nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes which restrict public
access to specific Government records. These would not be modified .... " H.R.
Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2418, 2427; see FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 263-65 (1975); Govern-
ment Information, supra note 3, at 1338-39.
29. See King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488, 495 (7th Cir. 1982); Washington Post Co. v
United States Dep't of State, 685 F.2d 698, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Scalia, J., state-
ment on denial of rehearing), vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983); Government
Information, supra note 3, at 1337-40; Note, The Effect of the 1976 Amendment to
Exemption Three of the Freedom of Information Act, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1029, 1029
n.5 (1976).
30. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,406 (1974).
31. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 Cong. Rec. 36,917-21 (1974).
32. See id. § 205(b), 120 Cong. Rec. at 36,920.
33. See id. § 205(a), 120 Cong. Rec. at 36,920.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(q) (1982); see 120 Cong. Rec. 40,400-05 (1974).
35. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 221 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.
1984] PRIVACY ACT 1339
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that the Privacy Act is an Exemption 3 statute impairs disclosure
under the FOIA, and thus is consistent with this implied legislative
intent.
Withholding statutes must meet one of two criteria before they fall
within Exemption 3.36 The statute must either leave no room for
agency discretion in the withholding of the information, or "[estab-
lish] particular criteria for withholding or [refer] to particular types of
matters to be withheld."'37 The Privacy Act does not satisfy the first
criterion because its exemptions are solely at the discretion of the
agency.38 The second criterion, however, has been the basis for hold-
ing the Privacy Act an Exemption 3 statute39 because the act "refers to
particular types of matters to be withheld."'40
Ct. 1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980); Misinterpreta-
tion, supra note 7, at 525-26; see also 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 48.18 (4th ed. 1973) (omission of a provision from a bill weakens a
judgment that Congress intended the inclusion of the omitted provisions). But see
Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 794 (3d Cir. 1983) (The "plain
language of section 552a(b) (2) is that the prohibition on disclosure in the Privacy Act
is inapplicable to Freedom of Information Act requests."); Greentree v. United States
Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("section (b)(2) of the Privacy Act
represents a Congressional mandate that the Privacy Act not be used as a barrier to
FOIA access.").
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982). Subsections (A) and (B) of Exemption 3 are
distinct from one another and only one need be satisfied. Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606
F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1075 (1980); American
Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see 122 Cong. Rec.
24,212-13 (1976) (colloquy between Representatives McCloskey and Fascell); 122
Cong. Rec. 24,181 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Abzug); H.R. Rep. No. 1441, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976) (conference report), reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2244, 2250.
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982).
38. Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 554 n. 155. The Privacy Act's exemptions
are permissive: "The head of any agency may promulgate rules ... to exempt any
system of records within the agency .... 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1982) (emphasis
added). The first prerequisite "is too rigorous to tolerate any decisionmaking on the
administrative level." American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
39. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 689-91 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. Terkel v.
Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) (no express holding that Privacy Act is
Exemption 3 statute; FOIA cannot disclose information that Privacy Act exempts),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). The Privacy Act exempts CIA records, 5 U.S.C. §
552a(j)(1) (1982), law enforcement investigatory records maintained by agencies
performing law enforcement functions, id. § 552aa)(2), classified state secrets, id. §
552a(k)(1), law enforcement investigatory material not held by law enforcement
agencies, except that the material will be provided to an individual if he would
otherwise be deprived of "any right, privilege, or benefit" if disclosure would not
reveal the identity of a confidential source who furnished information to the govern-
ment under a promise of confidentiality, id. § 552a(k)(2), information regarding
providing protective services to the President of the United States, id. § 552a(k)(3),
statistical information required by statute to be used 6nly as such, id. § 552a(k)(4),
1340 [Vol. 52
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If the Privacy Act is not an Exemption 3 statute, the FOIA may
provide access to information that is exempt under the Privacy Act
and thereby limit the efficacy of the Privacy Act's exemptions. 41 The
investigatory material regarding qualifications for Federal civilian employment, mil-
itary service, Federal contracts or access to classified information, to the extent that
disclosure would reveal a confidential source, id. § 552a(k)(5), materials for the
testing of qualification for appointment or promotion in Federal service to the extent
that disclosure would prejudice fairness of the testing process, id. § 552a(k)(6), and
armed services evaluational material to the extent that disclosure would reveal the
identity of a confidential source, id. § 552a(k)(7).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B) (1982). An Exemption 3 statute, however, also may be
required to establish criteria by which information is to be withheld. See Washington
Post Co. v. United States Dep't of State, 685 F.2d 698, 701-03 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983); Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1220-
21 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1075 (1980); American Jewish Congress
v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The Privacy Act does not establish
criteria for withholding; its exemptions are at the discretion of the agency. See 5
U.S.C. § 552a(j) (1982); cf. Church of Scientology v. United States Postal Serv., 633
F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1980) (Postal Service withholding provision does not satisfy
Exemption 3 because it allows complete discretion to disclose or withhold all investi-
gatory files). One commentator has suggested that identifying materials in the statute
is sufficient to establish a method by which agencies are to exercise discretion in
withholding information. Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 524 n.155. This reason-
ing, however, is flawed. See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice,
685 F.2d 698, 702 (referring to particular types of matters may not be enough; every
withholding statute will refer to something), vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983).
Alternatively, a very narrow category indicates that Congress was aware of the
dangers inherent in disclosing that particular type of information, and criteria for
withholding were not necessary. See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of
State, 685 F.2d 698, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983);
Founding Church of Scientology v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Lee
Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 616-17 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1073 (1979); American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 630 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122, 127 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1056 (1975). Finally, a withholding statute may satisfy Exemption 3 if an examina-
tion of the statute and its legislative history reveals "congressional appreciation of the
dangers" in disclosure. Founding Church of Scientology v. National Sec. Agency, 610
F.2d 824, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The legislative history of the Privacy Act exemp-
tions indicates that the identified files should not be disclosed to the subject of the
files. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
41. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 222 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980); Terkel v.
Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980);
Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 527. Holding the Privacy Act an Exemption 3
statute, however, contravenes the Privacy Act's consent waiver, 5 U.S.C. §
552a(b)(2) (1982). See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d
Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 78-79 (D.C. Cir.
1982). The consent waiver is seen as preserving first-party FOIA "access to informa-
tion for its own sake." Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d
Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir.
1982). Contra Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 220 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104
S. Ct. 1706 (1984).
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scope of the investigatory records exemption under the Privacy Act,
for example, was the subject of much debate, 42 and was resolved in
favor of an exemption broader than the corresponding FOIA exemp-
tion.43 Greater deference, therefore, should be given the Privacy Act
because it is the most recent expression of congressional intent. 44
B. The Privacy Act: An Independent Statute
Courts and commentators concluding that the Privacy Act is not an
Exemption 3 statute rely heavily on the language and purpose of the
Privacy Act.45 The Privacy Act was intended to increase access by
42. See, e.g., Access to Records: Hearings on H.R. 12206 and Related Bills before
the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 94-95 (1974); H.R. Rep.
1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 37-38 (1974), 120 Cong. Rec. 36,645, 36,961-62 (1974)
(remarks of Rep. Abzug).
The Senate Committee proposed Privacy Act exemptions for investigatory records
only if disclosure of the records would seriously impede the purposes for which the
information was maintained. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 203(b), 120 Cong. Rec.
36,885, 36,888 (1974). The proposed exemption was amended to mirror that of the
corresponding exemption under the FOIA, Exemption 7. Id. at 36,890, 36,920
(1974). This provision was ultimately rejected in favor of a blanket exemption. See
infra note 43.
43. The compromise bill adopted by the Government Operations Committees of
the House and Senate adheres to the broader House exemption and rejects the Senate
proposal for an exemption resembling the FOIA's Exemption 7. 120 Cong. Rec.
40,400, 40,402 (1974). Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982) (exempt if information
falls within one of 9 categories) with id. § 552a(j)(2) (blanket exemption).
44. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 222 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 1706 (1984); Duffin v. Carlson, 636 F.2d 709, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dictum);
Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690 (5th Cir. 1980); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Greentree v. United States
Customs Serv., 515 F. Supp. 1145, 1148 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 674 F.2d 74 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
45. See Porter v. United States Dep't of State, 717 F.2d 787, 796-99 (3d Cir.
1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79-84 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Privacy Act, supra note 7, at 152-56.
The FOIA contains a broad mandate for disclosure and its exemptions are to be
narrowly construed. See, e.g., Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1982)
(FOIA embodies broad disclosure and narrow exemptions); Department of Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (dominant purpose of FOIA is disclosure); Wash-
ington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of State, 685 F.2d 698, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(FOIA embodies broad disclosure and narrow exemptions), vacated as moot, 104 S.
Ct. 418 (1983); Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (same),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1075 (1980); S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965)
(same), reprinted in Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Freedom
of Information Act Source Book 36, 38 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as
FOIA Source Book]. Early commentators concluded that the FOIA's policy of broad
disclosure precluded the Privacy Act from being an Exemption 3 statute. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text. Courts concluding that the Privacy Act is not an
Exemption 3 statute have not considered whether the Privacy Act meets the require-
ments of Exemption 3. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797
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individuals to information about themselves. 46 Congress' decision to
limit such access with exemptions, however, does not necessarily re-
flect a desire to withhold this exempted information under the
FOIA.47 The Privacy Act and the FOIA should operate separately.
48
Moreover, several provisions contained in the Privacy Act preclude
its operation as an Exemption 3 statute. The Privacy Act's disclosure
exemptions apply only to persons seeking access under the Privacy
Act, 49 and not to those seeking access under other statutes. 50 In addi-
tion, the Privacy Act's "Conditions of Disclosure" provision waives the
consent requirement for required disclosures of personal information
under the FOIA.5 ' This waiver arguably "reinstates the essence" of the
provision omitted from the final version of the Privacy Act, providing
n.11 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentreev. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C.
Cir. 1982). See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
46. Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690 (5th Cir. 1980); see Greentree v. United
States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1982); H.R. Rep. No. 16,373, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., 120 Cong. Rec. 36,643 (1974) (Privacy Act intended to increase
government accountability and responsibility in protecting individuals' privacy);
1974 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6916, 6916-6917 (same); see also Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717
F.2d 787, 798 (3d Cir. 1983) (no congressional intent for Privacy Act to limit access
under the FOIA). The rights granted by the Privacy Act implement this governmen-
tal intent. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. The access requirement is
important to enable an individual to monitor the information concerning him main-
tained by an agency. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,897 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
47. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983);
Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 81, 83, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
see also Antonelli v. FBI, 536 F. Supp. 568, 572 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("Privacy Act was
not intended to override the FOIA."), rev'd on other grounds, 721 F.2d 615 (7th Cir.
1983).
48. Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 798-99 (3d Cir. 1983);
Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 81, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Privacy Act, supra note 7, at 160-61.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1982). Exemptions are made only from the provisions
of "this section," id., namely the Privacy Act.
50. Id.; see Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir.
1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1982). Disclosure is required under the FOIA if the
information does not fall within one of FOIA's exemptions, id. § 552(b) (specifying 9
exemptions). See infra note 62 and accompanying text. If the information falls within
one of the exemptions, however, disclosure is not barred, because the FOIA is a
disclosure statute-not a withholding statute. Planning Research Corp. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 555 F.2d 970, 973 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Charles River Park "A",
Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Thus, although the material is
exempt under the FOIA, the agency has discretion to release it. GTE Sylvania, Inc.
v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790, 800 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979)), aff'd, 447 U.S. 102 (1980). It is this
discretionary release of information that the Privacy Act would prohibit unless the
subject of the file granted consent to its release. See supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
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that exemption under the Privacy Act would not affect FOIA disclo-
sure.52 Congress noted that the waiver was intended to "preserve the
status quo as interpreted by the courts regarding the disclosure of
personal information under [the FOIA]." '53 Thus, the Privacy Act is
not an Exemption 3 statute because the FOIA's disclosure provisions
were to remain in effect, and the Privacy Act's exemptions are "self-
contained.
54
These opposing statutory analyses and determinations of legislative
intent are not conclusive in resolving the question whether the Privacy
Act is an Exemption 3 statute. Examination of the practical operation
of the two acts under each alternative may yield the interpretation
most consistent with the legislative intent of both statutes.
II. OPERATION OF THE FOIA AND THE PRIVACY ACT
A. Analyzing the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 Statute
Designation of the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 statute requires a
distinction to be drawn between application of the Privacy Act ex-
emptions to only the subject of a file or to all requesters.55 The Privacy
52. Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
see Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797, 798 (3d Cir. 1983).
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
53. 120 Cong. Rec. 40,406, 40,882 (1974). The status quo, which the consent
waiver was to maintain, was disclosure under the FOIA to "any person"-first- and
third-party requesters alike-without "plac[ing] the Privacy Act in the path of 'any
person' seeking access to information under FOIA." Greentree v. United States
Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 83 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see Porter v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 798 (3d Cir. 1983). Contra Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d
215, 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1983) ("status quo" at time of enactment of Privacy Act gave
third parties very little access to personal files), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984);
Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 526 & n.175 (consent waiver does no more than
waive consent if FOIA requires disclosure, it does not determine whether Privacy Act
exemptions bar FOIA disclosure).
54. Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
accord Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983).
55. See Government Information, supra note 3, at 1339; Misinterpretation, su-
pra note 7, at 530-31. This distinction has not been drawn by the courts that
apparently would restrict the application of the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3
statute to first-party requesters. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir.
1983) (third parties have access under FOIA notwithstanding Privacy Act exemp-
tions), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 691 n.3
(5th Cir. 1980) (Privacy Act is Exemption 3 statute yet court does not address scope of
exemption). The Terkel court did not expressly designate the Privacy Act as an
Exemption 3 statute, but merely stated that the FOIA and the Privacy Act must be
considered together, and that material exempted by the Privacy Act should be
withheld under the FOIA. Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). Thus, it is unclear whether that court would rule that
the Privacy Act prevents third- as well as first-party requesters from obtaining
information exempted under the Privacy Act.
[Vol. 521344
PRIVACY ACT
Act applies only to first-party requesters. 5 Exemption 3, therefore,
may incorporate the Privacy Act exemptions only as to first-party
requesters.57 The FOIA, however, applies to "any person."' 8 Thus,
once Privacy Act exemptions are incorporated into the FOIA, they
may be applied to all persons despite the application of the Privacy
Act only to the subject of a file.59 The operation of the Privacy Act as
an Exemption 3 statute depends upon which requesters are subject to
the Privacy Act exemptions.
1. The Incorporated Privacy Act Exemptions Applied Only to First-
Party Requesters
If Exemption 3 incorporates Privacy Act exemptions only as to first-
party requesters, the limited incorporation creates what has been
termed the third-party anomaly.60 Third parties may receive more
information about an individual under the FOIA than that individual
could obtain under either the Privacy Act or the FOIA with incorpo-
rated Privacy Act exemptions.6 ' The problem arises because of the
differences between the disclosure provisions of the two acts. FOIA
exemptions concerning personal information require that disclosure
decisions utilize a balancing test on a case-by-case basis.6 2 The agency
56. See supra note 5.
57. This is the approach taken by those holding the Privacy Act an Exemption 3
statute. See supra note 55.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982).
59. Government Information, supra note 3, at 1339; Misinterpretation, supra
note 7, at 530-31. The FOIA does not consider personal interests or motivations in its
disclosure determinations; its access provisions as well as exemptions apply to "any
person." Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d
787, 790 n.3 (6th Cir. 1972); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
see H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (1972); H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2418, 2418;
S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1965), reprinted in FOIA Source Book,
supra note 45, at 40-41.
60. See Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79-80 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 530 n.205; Letter from Senator Edward M.
Kennedy to United States Attorney General Edward Levi (Aug. 26, 1975), reprinted
in 121 Cong. Rec. 32,890-91 (1975).
61. Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
1706 (1984); Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 795 (3d Cir.
1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79-80 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
62. Government Information, supra note 3, at 1336-37; see Department of Air
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369-70 (1976); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677
n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In the absence of an applicable exemption, the court has no
power to prevent disclosure. Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of State,
685 F.2d 698, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 104 S. Ct. 418 (1983); Getman
v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber
Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1978); Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882, 884 (2d Cir. 1984).
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must weigh the potential harm of disclosure to the government or
individual63 against the public interest in disclosure. 4 The FOIA also
has a provision for the release of segregable portions of requested
information if all of the information need not be disclosed.65 The
Privacy Act has no balancing test and no provision for the release of
segregable portions of requested information.6 6 If the information is
contained in the types of files that have been prospectively exempted,
the information need not be released. 67 Therefore, it is possible that a
specific record exempt under the Privacy Act would be available in
whole or in part under the FOIA.
All Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) records, for example, are
exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act.68 Thus, the first-party
requester would never have access to CIA records. 69 Under the FOIA,
however, CIA records are exempt only to the extent provided by the
FOIA's exemptions. 70 In particular, Exemption 7 withholds investiga-
63. The individual may be either the subject of a file or any person mentioned in
the file. Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974, Source Book 333
(Comm. Print 1975); see Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
64. See, e.g., Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369-70 (1976)
(weighing potential harm to government and concerned individuals against pubic
interest in disclosure); Antonelli v. FBI, 721 F.2d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 1983) (weighing
privacy interest against public interest in disclosure); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982)
(personnel and medical files), id. § 552(b)(7) (investigatory records).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
66. The Privacy Act "does not require that a regulation's rationale for exempting
a record from disclosure apply in each particular case. It is sufficient that the system
of records be exempted properly .... " Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); see 5 U.S.C. § 552a (j), (k) (1982).
67. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 1706 (1984). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1) (1982). This section provides that:
The head of any agency may promulgate rules ... to exempt any system of
records within the agency from any part of this section ... if the system of
records is-(1) maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency ....
Id.
69. The operation of Exemption 3 is similar to that of the Privacy Act exemptions
in that "the sole issue for decision is the existence of a relevant statute and inclusion of
the withheld material within that statute's coverage." Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339,
350 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1982). CIA records have additional protection from
disclosure for information regarding intelligence sources and methods. 50 U.S.C. §
403(d) (3), (g) (1976). Section 403(d) (3) and (g) are Exemption 3 withholding statutes.
Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The CIA may not,
however, "refuse to provide any information at all about anything it does." Phillippi
v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1015 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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tive records that would harm either the government or an individ-
ual. 71 Specifically, it withholds investigative records that would jeop-
ardize an enforcement proceeding or the right to a fair trial,72 would
reveal the source of confidential information, 73 would reveal secret
investigative techniques,74 would endanger the life or safety of law
enforcement personnel, 75 or would result in an invasion of privacy.
76
If the record or a portion thereof does not violate one of these provi-
sions, it must be disclosed to the third-party requester. 77 The first
party's access, however, is barred by the Privacy Act's blanket exemp-
tion, an absurd result.
Those supporting Exemption 3 status for the Privacy Act dismiss the
potential effect of the third party anomaly78 as unlikely to occur with
any frequency. 9 The infrequency of occurrence, however, should not
support an interpretation that creates this anomaly.80 The mere possi-
bility that a member of the general public could obtain information
about an individual, that the individual himself could not, is incon-
sistent with the Privacy Act's main purpose-to protect the individ-
ual's privacy. 81 It would be ironic to interpret the Privacy Act to allow
greater dissemination of personal information to the public than to the
concerned individual. 82
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982); see FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 627 (1982);
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 229-30 (1978); Williams v. FBI,
730 F.2d 882, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1984).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), (B) (1982).
73. Id. § 552(b)(7)(D).
74. Id. § 552(b)(7)(E).
75. Id. § 552(b)(7)(F).
76. Id. § 552 (b)(7)(C).
77. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
78. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690 (5th Cir. 1980); Misinterpreta-
tion, supra note 7, at 530-31.
79. Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
1706 (1984); see also Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690 (5th Cir. 1980) (acknowledges
anomaly but concludes that Privacy Act is an Exemption 3 statute); cf. Misinterpre-
tation, supra note 7, at 530-31 (third party anomaly should be solved by applying
Privacy Act exemptions to all requesters).
80. See Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79-80 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (court confronted with "rare case" holds that because of anomaly Congress
could not have intended Privacy Act to be an Exemption 3 statute). This is consistent
with the rule that when the language of a statute is subject to differing interpreta-
tions, the words should be construed to produce a rational result. 2A C. Sands,
Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45.12 (4th ed. 1973); see Sierra
Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 1977).
81. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983);
Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
82. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983);
Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79-80 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
1984] 1347
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Further, designating the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 statute to
be applied only to the subject of the file may not always prevent his
access to material exempt under the Privacy Act. The first-party
requester may circumvent Exemption 3 by requesting information
through a third party.8 3 Thus, Privacy Act exemptions could be under-
mined even if the Privacy Act were designated an Exemption 3 statute
but applied only to the first-party requester. s4 If the primary rationale
behind applying the Privacy Act as an Exemption 3 statute is to
maintain the effectiveness of the Privacy Act exemptions, these ex-
emptions must be applied to all requesters. 5
2. The Incorporated Privacy Act Exemptions Applied
to all Requesters
If the Privacy Act exemptions are applied through Exemption 3 to
all requesters, the third-party anomaly is avoided because both first
and third parties would have equal access. 86 Other problems arise,
however, that affect the scope of disclosure under the-FOIA.
Applying Privacy Act exemptions to all requesters reduces disclo-
sure under the FOIA. 7 All CIA records, for example, are completely
83. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 795-96 (3d Cir.
1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79, 80 (D.C. Cir.
1982). Consent by the subject of the file may accomplish release of information to the
public even if the information would not have been available under the Privacy Act,
or would be an invasion of privacy under FOIA provisions. See Porter v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 795 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States
Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Rushford v. Civiletti, 485 F. Supp.
477, 479 (D.D.C. 1980) (dictum).
84. See Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir.
1982). The third-party anomaly enables third parties to obtain information that the
individual could not. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. The individual
would undoubtedly obtain the information because if the information were available
to the public, "how could it be kept from the party whom it concerned?" Greentree
v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
85. Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 531. If the first-party requester ought
never to have access to information exempted under the Privacy Act, this material
must be withheld under the FOIA because the first-party could otherwise gain access
through a third party. See Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79(D.C. Cir. 1982) (court acknowledges that first-party requesters could circumvent
Privacy Act exemptions and holds Privacy Act not an Exemption 3 statute); Terkel v.
Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) (FOIA cannot compel release of information
exempt under the Privacy Act), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). But see Govern-
ment Information, supra note 3, at 1338 (Privacy Act does not require that certain
records be kept confidential from the subject, it allows exemption from its own
subject access requirement).
86. First and third parties would have equal access because both are subject to
the Privacy Act exemptions as incorporated into the FOIA. See Misinterpretation,
supra note 7, at 530-31.
87. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983).
But see Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 222-23 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 1706 (1984).
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exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act;s8 incorporating Privacy
Act exemptions into the FOIA would include this total exemption.
CIA records, however, may be disclosed under the FOIA89 if the
information does not fall within one of the FOIA exemptions.9 0 There
is no indication that Congress intended to insulate the CIA completely
by enacting the Privacy Act.9' Thus, this interpretation goes beyond
legislative intent.
Incorporating Privacy Act exemptions for investigatory records
would further undermine the FOIA's Exemption 7 when applied to
non-CIA investigatory records. The Privacy Act's exemptions are
predicated on the nature of the records.2 If the records are investiga-
tory in nature and compiled for law enforcement purposes, the rec-
ords may be exempted.9 3 By contrast, Exemption 7 bases its determi-
nation on the nature of the records' contents.9 4 The blanket
exemptions under the Privacy Act that enable agencies to withhold
entire systems of records would preempt the case-by-case approach of
Exemption 7.15
Preempting the utilization of Exemption 7's disclosure test through
the incorporation of these two Privacy Act exemptions would repeal
Exemption 7 by implication.98 The disclosure test in Exemption 7 was
88. 5 U.S.C. § 552aa)(1) (1982).
89. See supra notes 19, 70 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 62. The CIA's Exemption 3 withholding statutes do not
provide complete immunity from disclosures. See supra note 70. Further, Congress is
currently considering a bill that would broaden CIA disclosure exemptions, yet does
not contemplate removing all CIA records from disclosure. See Statement of Mary C.
Lawton, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Before House Perma-
nent Select Comm. on Intelligence, on H.R. 3460 and H.R. 4431 (available in files of
Fordham Law Review).
91. If Congress' intent is to insulate all CIA records from disclosure, proposed
H.R. 3460 and H.R. 4431 are meaningless because CIA records are already exempt.
92. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
93. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2), (k)(2) (1982).
94. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
95. The factual determination of the contents of the requested file, required by
Exemption 7, is not necessary when dealing with a valid Exemption 3 statute.
Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980).
96. See Provenzano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 799, 800 (3d Cir.
1983) (per curiam), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Porter v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States
Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
The original Exemption 7 permitted the withholding of "investigatory files com-
piled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a private
party." Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 251 (1966). Exemption 7 was amended in
1974. Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563-64 (1974) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982)). See supra note 19. The statute was amended becausejudicial interpretation of the original Exemption withheld almost all law enforce-
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included by an amendment enacted to broaden disclosures of investi-
gatory records97 and passed while Congress was considering the Pri-
vacy Act.9 It is unlikely that Congress would amend Exemption 7 to
broaden disclosure, only to repeal the amendment a few weeks later
when the Privacy Act was enacted. 99
Applying Privacy Act exemptions to "any person" who requests
information under the FOIA avoids the problems that arise when the
application is limited to first-party requesters. If the Privacy Act is
rationally to be construed as an Exemption 3 statute, its exemptions
must be applied through the FOIA to all requesters. This interpreta-
tion, however, seriously delimits the scope of disclosure under the
FOIA, thus frustrating Congressional intent that the FOIA compel
disclosure unless the information falls within narrowly drawn exemp-
tions.
B. Analyzing the Privacy Act as an Independent Statute
When the Privacy Act operates independently of the FOIA, it is also
possible to distinguish between first- and third-party requesters in
determining which statute may be used to obtain access. By its terms,
ment records. 120 Cong. Rec. 17,033 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart); see, e.g.,
Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (irrelevant that
disclosure would not harm government), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Aspin v.
Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (termination of investiga-
tion or enforcement proceeding does not affect withholding decision); Weisberg v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (classification of
information as investigatory not subject to appellate review), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
993 (1974); see also 120 Cong. Rec. 17,033-34 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart) (broad
interpretation of Exemption 7 is inconsistent with FOIA's disclosure purpose).
97. The word "file" in the original Exemption 7 was changed to "record" in order
to require a review of the contents of the file before exemption is permitted. Compare
Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563-64 (1974) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)) ("records") with Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 251 (1966)
("files"). Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882, 884 (2d Cir. 1984); see NLRB v. Robbins
Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 229-30 (1978). Further, exemption is permitted for
only those files the contents of which are covered by the six categories specified in
Exemption 7. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 627 (1982); Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d
882, 884 (2d Cir. 1984). See supra note 62.
98. 120 Cong. Rec. 36,645 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn) (noting that
Privacy Act came to the floor the same day Exemption 7 was amended over presiden-
tial veto); see Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 83, 88 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Duffin v. Carlson, 636 F.2d 709, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1980). But see Shapiro v.
DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 222 (7th Cir. 1983) (Congress would not provide broad nondis-
closure provisions in the Privacy Act and intend that they be bypassed by the recently
expanded Exemption 7), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984).
99. Repeal by implication is not favored. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976); United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S.
164, 168 (1976); Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir.
1983); Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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the Privacy Act would remain applicable only to first-party request-
ers.'00 The FOIA, on the other hand, may apply either to all request-
ers or only to third-party requesters.' 0
If the Privacy Act is not characterized as an Exemption 3 statute,
first-party requesters may be limited to access under the Privacy
Act. 0 2 This, however, produces the third-party anomaly because
third parties have access to the more liberal FOIA disclosure provi-
sions. 10 3
Alternatively, the first-party requester may request the records un-
der the Privacy Act or the FOIA.'0 4 This approach eliminates the
third-party anomaly, as both first and third parties would have equal
access. Additionally, FOIA disclosure provisions would not be limited
by incorporation of the broader Privacy Act exemptions.'0 5 Allowing a
first-party requester to avoid Privacy Act exemptions by making a
request under the FOIA, however, limits the effectiveness of Privacy
Act exemptions.'0
The exemptions to the Privacy Act were included in recognition
that certain types of files are not appropriately released to the subject
of the file.'0 7 Thus, use of the FOIA to disclose Privacy Act-exempted
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1982).
101. The FOIA, however, applies to "any person," a term that should not exclude
first-party requesters. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797
(3d Cir. 1983). See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
102. This was the position taken by the Office of Management and Budget, see
OMB Report, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741, 56,742 (1975), and by the Justice Department,
see 28 C.F.R. § 16.57 (1983); Letter from Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. Mary C.
Lawton to Meade Whitaker, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service (July 30,
1975), reprinted in 121 Cong. Rec. 32,889-90 (1975). Porter held that first-party
requesters are not limited to Privacy Act provisions. Porter v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983). But see Misinterpretation, supra note 3, at
527 ("[N]othing in [congressional] debates indicates that Congress intended to allow
individuals to obtain their investigatory records through means other than the access
provisions of the Privacy Act.").
103. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
104. See Provenzano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 799, 800 (3d Cir.
1983) (per curiam), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); Porter v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983); Greentree v. United States
Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
105. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
106. Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 221 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
1706 (1984); see Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980); Terkel v.
Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
107. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 23 ("[lt would not be appropriate to
allow individuals to see their own intelligence or investigative files."), reprinted in
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6938; H.R. Rep. No. 1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
18 (1974); 1974 House Report, supra note 44, at 18 (Broad CIA and investigative
records exemptions are "permissible ... because [such records] contain particularly
sensitive information.").
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information to a first-party requester may contravene the legislative
intent underlying the Privacy Act. 10 8 The Privacy Act, however, was
intended to protect the individual from government invasions of pri-
vacy. 109 Thus, the individual is afforded greater access, in some in-
stances, under the Privacy Act than under the FOIA."10
The Privacy Act exemptions represent Congress' unwillingness to
extend the additional access of the Act to the types of materials
indicated in the exemptions, rather than an intent to withhold those
materials completely."' The individual is granted a right under the
Privacy Act to challenge the contents of the files." 2 Further, the
Privacy Act dictates the manner in which agencies must obtain, verify
and store personal information. " 3 This framework enables an individ-
ual to monitor the information collected, maintained, and dissemi-
nated about him," 4 thus preventing governmental intrusions into his
privacy.
108. Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 221 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
1706 (1984); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980); see Terkel v.
Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980);
Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at 527-28.
109. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
110. Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 80-81 (D.C. Cir.
1982); see Government information, supra note 3, at 1336-37. See supra notes 15, 46
and accompanying text. An individual will have greater access under the Privacy Act
than would "any person" under the FOIA if the record he requested was not in a
system of records which had not been exempted prior to the request. See Shapiro v.
DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); 5
U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1982); see, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §9 16.71-.103 (1983) (agency
regulations exempting systems of records under the Privacy Act). Additionally, under
the FOIA, the identity of the requester is not considered when making disclosure
decisions. Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973); see Hawkes v. IRS, 467
F.2d 787, 790 n.3 (6th Cir. 1972); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir.
1971). Under FOIA access provisions, a first-party requester has the same right to
information about himself as would "any person" requesting the same file. NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975); Moorefield v. United States Secret
Serv., 611 F.2d 1021, 1023 n.2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 909 (1980); Cox v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 1305 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978). Invasion of
privacy determinations under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA must balance the
public interest in disclosure against the interest in nondisclosure. Department of Air
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976). The requester's personal interest will not
enter into that balancing process. Antonelli v. FBI, 721 F.2d 615, 619 (7th Cir.
1983); Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1981).
111. See Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983);
Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Govern-
ment Information, supra note 3, at 1338.
112. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2), (3), (4) (1982).
113. Id. § 552a(d), (e).
114. See id. § 552a(g)(1). Although § 552a(i) provides criminal penalties for
agency violations of the Privacy Act, enforcement of the Privacy Act is generally left
to the injured first-party requester. The addition of a civil remedy was one of the
improvements afforded by the FOIA when it amended the Administrative Procedure
On the other hand, if the Privacy Act's main purpose is to ensure
that its exemptions prevent any first-party access to exempted mate-
rial, the Privacy Act's exemptions must be incorporated into the FOIA
and applied to all requesters. 15 This, however, undermines FOIA
disclosure." 6 Clearly, a choice must be made as to which statute is to
take precedence.
The independent operation of the Privacy Act, in combination with
FOIA access for all requesters, is consistent with the primary purposes
of both the FOIA and the Privacy Act.17 Moreover, such a holding is
not inconsistent with the Privacy Act's exemptions." 8 The use of FOIA
access provisions by first-party requesters is not a guarantee of disclo-
sure.1n 9 There are a number of obstacles under the FOIA that prevent
access to information which should not be disclosed. The information
that is not disclosed under the FOIA is similar to the type of informa-
tion exempted by the Privacy Act. 20 The information that would be
disclosed under the FOIA, but exempted under the Privacy Act, is
information that Congress has determined to be properly disclosed to
the public. The first-party requester should not be distinguished from
the general public and, therefore, the information should also be
available to him.
For example, the FOIA may not be used as a discovery tool.' 2 '
First-party requesters have been denied access to investigatory records
Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946). Civil litigation was intended to enforce the
FOIA. See S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965), reprinted in FOIA Source
Book, supra note 45, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5, 9,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2418, 2426.
115. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
116. FOIA case-by-case disclosure decisions would be preempted, resulting in a
repeal by implication of FOIA exemptions. See supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
117. Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
see Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983). See
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
118. Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
see Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983). See
infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text. But see Misinterpretation, supra note 7, at
531.
119. Third parties do not often have access under the FOIA to information that
would be withheld from the first-party requester under the Privacy Act. Shapiro v.
DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984); see
Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 80, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1982). If a
third party would not have access, however, neither should the first party, as the
information should not be available to "any person." Greentree, 674 F.2d at 83 n.23.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
120. See Government Information, supra note 3, at 1337 (disclosure decisions
made under FOIA rather than Privacy Act because Privacy Act contains provisions
exempting required FOIA disclosures from Privacy Act requirements).
121. "The primary purpose of the FOIA was not to benefit private litigants or to
serve as a substitute for civil discovery." Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 n.14
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concerning themselves before, during, and to some extent, after an
investigation. 12 2 The Privacy Act exemptions for investigatory records
are directed towards withholding the same type of materials. 123 More-
over, the first-party requester may not have greater access under the
FOIA even when FOIA disclosure decisions are based on protection of
the privacy interest because the privacy interest is not necessarily only
that of the subject of the file. 2 4 FOIA's Exemption 6, for example,
exempts personnel files if disclosure would constitute a "clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy.' 2 5 The corresponding Pri-
vacy Act exemptions permit the withholding of all personnel files that
relate to employment or promotion decisions, but "only to the extent
that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a
source who furnished information to the Government under an ex-
press promise that the identity of the source would be held in confi-
dence .... ,,126 Although access to this type of information under the
FOIA may not constitute an unwarranted invasion of the requester's
privacy, 2 1 revealing the identity of a confidential source of informa-
(1982); see Antonelli v. FBI, 721 F.2d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 1983); Stein v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1260 (7th Cir. 1981); Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75
(2d Cir. 1981); S. Rep. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974), reprinted in House
Comm. on Government Operations and Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-
502) Source Book at 171 (Comm. Print 1975).
122. Investigatory records are exempt under Exemption 7 if their disclosure would
interfere with an enforcement proceeding or deprive a person of a fair and impartial
adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), (B) (1982). These exemptions permit the
withholding of information before and during an investigation or enforcement pro-
ceeding. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 241 (1978); United
States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 601-03 (5th Cir. 1977); Fruehauf Corp. v. Thorn-
ton, 507 F.2d 1253, 1254 (6th Cir. 1974). Several courts have withheld information
even after the investigation or enforcement proceeding. See, e.g., Antonelli v. FBI,
721 F.2d 615, 618, 619 (7th Cir. 1983); Stein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 662
F.2d 1245, 1261 (7th Cir. 1981); Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1981).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1982); see United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599,
601-03 (5th Cir. 1977) (neither the Privacy Act nor the FOIA provide supplemental
discovery rights).
124. Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1013 (1980); Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978). See supra note
111 and accompanying text.
125. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982).
126. Id. § 552a(k)(5) (employment decisions), (7) (promotions).
127. Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978); cf. S. Conf. Rep.
No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6285,
6292 (in the context of amending FOIA's Exemption 7 the Conference Committee
noted that "disclosure of information about a person to that person does not consti-
tute an invasion of privacy").
128. See Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1979) (invasion of source's
right to privacy warrants withholding information under Exemption 7), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978)
(same); Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom
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tion may be an invasion of the source's privacy right. Thus, the
information could be withheld under Exemption 6.
Some material that is exempt under the Privacy Act, however, may
be disclosed under the FOIA. 19 This is a result of the Privacy Act's
broader exemptions, which are made on the basis of the nature of the
file, rather than on the contents. 130 The breadth of the Privacy Act
exemptions eases disclosure decisions and other administrative re-
quirements imposed by the Act, but may encompass material that
could be disclosed harmlessly.' 3' The FOIA's exemptions withhold
information whose disclosure would harm the government. Because
the FOIA mandates disclosure of non-exempt files to "any person,"
the Privacy Act should not operate to withhold harmless information
from any person unless Congress has unequivocally so stated.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the statutory language and legislative intent is not deter-
minative in resolving whether the Privacy Act impairs FOIA disclo-
sure. A major issue that must be resolved is the identification of the
policies underlying the two acts. After these policies have been deter-
mined, it becomes simple to resolve whether the Privacy Act is an
Exemption 3 statute, whether first-party access is limited to Privacy
Act provisions, or whether the Privacy Act may in any other way
impair FOIA disclosure. The alternative policies should be based upon
allowing all requesters equal access to government information, as it is
absurd to allow third-party requesters to obtain more information
about an individual than could the individual himself. Thus, the real
dispute is whether the Privacy Act amends the FOIA's mandate of
broad disclosure to mirror the Privacy Act's blanket exemptions, or
whether the Privacy Act is a grant of additional rights to first-party
requesters and the exemptions merely boundaries limiting that grant.
Incorporating Privacy Act exemptions into the FOIA necessarily im-
plies that Congress intended to drastically limit FOIA disclosure of
government information. Congress, however, has consistently main-
tained a policy of broad disclosure and has repeatedly rejected the
of Information Act (1975), reprinted in House Comm. on Government Operations
and Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Freedom of Information
Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502) Source Book 119 (Comm. Print 1975)
(language of Exemption 7 invasion of privacy provision is virtually identical to that of
Exemption 6 and determinations of invasion of privacy will be similar in both cases).
129. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
131. See Shapiro v. DEA, 721 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 1706 (1984).
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blanket application of FOIA exemptions. Because there is no express
indication that the Privacy Act was intended to either narrow FOIA
disclosure or to impose blanket FOIA exemptions, the logical conclu-
sion is that the Privacy Act should not be construed to do so. Rather,
the Privacy Act should be characterized as an additional grant of
privacy safeguards to the individual, having no effect on FOIA disclo-
sure either to first- or third-party requesters. Thus, the Privacy Act is
neither an Exemption 3 statute, nor does it restrict first-party request-
ers to its access provisions.
Susan Marble
